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ONE APPROACH, T WO RESULTS
The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault
during the World Wars
Ethan S. Rafuse

I

n the past few decades, students of military affairs have looked repeatedly to
the first half of the twentieth century, and the efforts of military organizations
to adapt to the changing tools of war during and between the two world wars,
to understand why some military organizations are successful on the battlefield
and others are not. It is safe to say that few, if any, military organizations have
fared worse at the hands of students of the interwar period than the French army.
This is not surprising. The disastrous 1940 campaign seemed to offer a compelling verdict on the contrasting approaches that French military institutions and
their German counterparts took to develop uses for the military tools that were
introduced in the previous war. In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps traditionally
has received high marks for its efforts during the interwar period. This, too, is
not surprising, as its solution to the problem of how to make a successful opposed
amphibious landing was a key contribution to the U.S. victory over imperial
Japan.1
What follows is another look at the innovation efforts that the French army
and the U.S. Marines made during the interwar period and the methods they
brought to the World War II battlefield and the particular problems they faced.
There is little doubt that there were significant difEthan S. Rafuse is a professor of military history at
ferences both in their organizational approaches to
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colthese problems and in the results those approaches
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be its effectiveness on the battlefield. Yet closer
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examination of the problems each faced and the
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answers they developed reveals more in common between the French army and
the Marines than the operational results they achieved suggest, and offers a compelling reminder when studying the past to heed Sir Michael Howard’s famous
admonition to do so in width, depth, and context.2 It is not the intent of this article either to deny the Marines their well-merited laurels by association with the
defeated French army, or to ignore the serious issues with the latter that make it
a useful subject for considering undesirable qualities in a military organization.
Still, there is a danger that making battlefield outcomes the sole determinant of
how we assess military organizations can lead to insufficient appreciation of context, contingency, and detail, and thus an incomplete understanding.
BREAKING THROUGH THE TRENCHES
Of course, the military organizations that prepared for and fought the Second
World War did so with the Great War’s oppressively heavy shadow cast over nearly everything they did. The problems illustrated by the tactical and operational
stalemate that prevailed on the western front for most of the war, and its eventual
resolution, weighed most heavily. When the western front consolidated at the end
of the dramatic maneuvers of 1914, the French army and its British and Belgian
allies had fended off defeat but faced what proved to be a formidable task—that
is, driving the German army off the soil of France and Belgium before the strain
and hardship of their societies’ near-complete mobilization for the war became
unsustainable.3 With the German flanks effectively secured by the mountainous
Swiss border and the English Channel, turning movements and envelopments
were unfeasible. Consequently, the French had to figure out how to conduct successful frontal assaults on fortified enemy positions that would create a tactical
penetration deep and broad enough to be exploited operationally. The means
available to French commanders were effectively limited to artillery and infantry;
new technologies such as the tank and airplane were too immature to play more
than a supporting role. This simplified their operational problem considerably
and made the solution rather obvious: use artillery to smash the enemy’s lines,
then send foot soldiers “over the top” to cross the deadly ground and attack the
enemy’s lines. They hoped that the artillery bombardment would weaken the defenders sufficiently that the attackers could find a hole in the line or, with effort,
create one that was large enough for a complete penetration to be accomplished,
which would set the stage for a full tactical and operational exploitation.4
If the concept was simple enough, successful execution was another thing
altogether. The problem was not that artillery was incapable of creating conditions for a tactical penetration. From the time the method first was applied, the
French and their allies demonstrated that, while crossing no-man’s-land was
costly, afterward infantry usually could find the enemy sufficiently weakened
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by the preliminary bombardment to achieve a tactical penetration—a “breakin” that gave the Allies possession of part of the enemy line. The problem was
sustaining the assault’s momentum to turn the penetration into a breakthrough.
In essence, once a penetration had been created, the two sides found themselves
in a race. With the assault force exhausted and bloodied by the effort of creating
the penetration, the tactical commander then had to send reserves up in the right
place to exploit the breach before the tactical defender could bring up his own
reserves to contain it and launch a counterattack. It was exceedingly difficult for
an attacker on the western front to win this race. It invariably took more time
for reports of a successful penetration to reach the headquarters of the attacking
commander than it did to reach the defender’s, who also would have been alerted
by the attacker’s bombardments to begin moving up reserves. Any penetration
site was necessarily in range of the defender’s artillery and the high density of
manpower and infrastructure on the western front meant that the attacker’s own
artillery support was less effective the farther he advanced. The defender’s rear
area also was usually better ground over which to move reserve forces than was
the artillery-chewed expanse of no-man’s-land that attacking reserves had to
cross.5 The French and their allies made notable improvements and refinements
to the type and employment of their artillery, such as the development of the rolling barrage, that forced the Germans to make fundamental changes to their defensive tactics; however, they remained unable to turn tactical penetrations into
tactical breakthroughs that could be exploited to achieve operational success.6
By 1916, a growing number of commanders concluded that the problems
associated with the frontal assault in the face of modern firepower meant that
efforts to achieve an operational breakthrough were not realistic. Even French
commander Joseph Joffre, who had been an enthusiastic supporter of offensive
operations early on, accepted the merit of this argument, albeit reluctantly.7
Improvements in artillery and infantry techniques kindled hopes for a breakthrough after tactical successes at the Somme and Verdun in 1916. However, the
Germans then developed the defense-in-depth concept in response, negating
those offensive innovations and leading to the catastrophe of the Allies’ Nivelle
offensive in April 1917. After that failure, Philippe Pétain, who had been skeptical
of pursuing breakthroughs since the beginning of the war, became head of the
French army and brought, in the words of historian Douglas Porch, “a sobering
note of reality to . . . operations.”8
Pétain advocated what some referred to as a “bite and hold” approach. Heavy
artillery was employed as before, leveraging refinements in both tools and
techniques, to saturate and destroy as much of the enemy front line as possible.
Infantry then went over the top, with a rolling barrage preceding its advance.
This necessitated a tightly planned, phased advance over a broad front, and
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the discretion granted to lower-level commanders was circumscribed tightly to
ensure that troop movement was coordinated with the barrage. This enabled
enough men to reach the enemy lines to achieve a tactical penetration. Unlike
before, though, the idea of exploitation was eschewed, so once the enemy lines
were seized there was no “race” to expand the penetration or bring up reserves.
In line with plans developed by higher headquarters, the infantry then would
halt and, instead of attempting to turn the penetration into a breakthrough,
would stay under the cover of its own artillery and repel enemy counterattacks.
The infantry would consolidate its new position while heavy artillery was moved
forward. “The artillery conquers the positions,” Pétain famously explained, “the
infantry occupies them.”9
The effectiveness of these tactics was hard to dispute. By the end of 1916,
improvements in heavy artillery enabled attackers to inflict unsustainable destruction on defending troops packed in forward defensive lines. This led to significant reductions in the number of troops holding forward defensive positions,
which made tactical penetrations all the more achievable. Under Pétain, the
French successfully resumed offensive operations in late 1917, providing a muchneeded boost to morale in the French ranks following the mutinies that broke
out after the failed Nivelle offensive.10 In 1918, these methods were incorporated
into a broader offensive approach by conducting a series of limited and methodical operations at one point along the German line before moving on to another.
While tanks and aircraft played a role in these operations, it was improvements
in the efficiency and effectiveness of artillery, and its liberal use, that were “the
true artisan of victory,” in Hew Strachan’s words. In the process of methodically
pushing the enemy back—while also conserving French manpower—these operations imposed enough casualties on an exhausted German army that its leaders had no choice but to throw in the towel in November 1918. Thus, the French
were able to claim victory at the end of the war, not through the dramatic blows
on the battlefield envisioned at its start, but by exhausting the enemy through the
accumulation of numerous limited tactical gains over time.11
INTERWAR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN
FRANCE AND GERMANY
Despite their success in World War I, there were significant issues with France’s
methodical tactics. First, these methods do not produce quick, dramatic, or decisive battlefield results. Consequently, they could not be employed by a belligerent
whose strategic and operational situation required a quick battlefield decision.
The differences in the broader strategic contexts in which France and Germany
found themselves thus drove divergent doctrine development models in the leadup to the next war.
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France Commits to the Bataille Conduit
As Robert A. Doughty and other historians have chronicled, France’s methods
also contained the seeds of a problematic military culture and a faulty approach
to innovation during the interwar period that translated into disaster for the
French in 1940. During the 1920s, French doctrine anchored itself to “the bataille
conduit, or methodical battle,” which “resembled the methods used in World War
I, but it represented an intensification of those methods,” “a step-by-step battle
in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly
scheduled timetables. . . . [A]rtillery provided the momentum and the rhythm
for the attack.” Infantry was expected to make only relatively shallow advances “to
remain under the umbrella of artillery protection.”12 Whatever the merits of these
tactics, there is no dispute that they had significant ramifications for the culture
of the army that adopted them. By their nature, they required a very top-down
approach to tactical planning and battlefield execution, as the employment of
infantry and artillery had to be tightly coordinated, and plans had to be followed
as close to the letter as possible, leaving little room for lower-level initiative.13
In service of this doctrine, French leaders systematically purged the aggressive and audacious spirit of Napoléon from the minds of their officers in favor of
“rigid centralization and strict obedience,” and thereby undermined their ability
to respond effectively to unexpected developments on the battlefield.14 It also
led the French to take flawed approaches to the study of World War I and the
possible employment of armor. Focusing almost exclusively on operations that
validated the methodical battle doctrine, they failed to recognize new possibilities suggested by the war and improvements in air and armor technology. They
tied tanks and infantry to the use of firepower rather than empowering them to
exploit tactical penetrations dynamically and aggressively on their own. Furthermore, the hierarchical, top-down culture fostered by the methodical battle doctrine had the effect of discouraging open discussion of new ideas and concepts,
especially in the country’s institutions of professional military education, which
became little more than inculcators of doctrine. This precluded the sort of honest, realistic consideration of doctrine and organizational agility that might have
enabled the French army to recognize and address problems in its planning and
execution of operations in 1940 more quickly. “France committed the glaring
mistake,” Doughty concludes, “of trying to impose her way of war on the enemy
without having suitable recourse should this attempt fail. . . . The notion of a carefully controlled and tightly centralized battle belonged to another era.”15
Germany’s Dynamic Response
Further damaging “bite and hold” tactics in the eyes of historians is the contrasting
and more dramatic approach that the German army took to tactical innovation
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during and after World War I. By late 1917, German resources had been exhausted
to the point that it was impractical for army leaders to follow the French approach
of relying on large amounts of heavy artillery and methodical operations. Moreover, the need for a dramatic victory before American matériel and manpower
irreversibly tipped the scales against them on the western front meant that any
approach that could not achieve a tactical and operational breakthrough was
inadequate to Germany’s strategic needs. The result of German efforts to address
the problem was the infiltration tactics of 1918, which also laid the foundation for
the army’s doctrinal and organizational development during the interwar period
and were directly connected to the victory of 1940.16
The fundamental issue, as noted earlier, was how to employ artillery and
infantry to enable the attacker not just to achieve a penetration but to win the
race between his effort to exploit and the defender’s effort to contain that tactical penetration. Instead of following the French massed artillery and infantry
approach to wear down the enemy, the Germans applied speed and maneuver to
the problem. Rather than pursuing destruction of enemy positions through heavy
bombardments, German doctrine used short, concentrated bombardments
with the objective of neutralizing defenders through disruption. This would
be followed quickly by probes to identify weak points in the enemy defenses.
Sturmtruppen (storm trooper—also called Stoßtruppen) assault units then would
come up to maintain momentum against the assault’s preeminent objective
and bypass strongpoints and pockets of resistance, push deep into the enemy
position, and attack headquarters and rear areas. Sustaining the momentum of
the advance and focusing more on the depth of attack than on maintaining a
continuous line, in combination with the high tempo of the German advance,
frustrated the ability of defenders to bring up reserves to contain penetrations by
disrupting command and control. With command broken down and Germans in
their rear, bypassed positions would be taken not through attritional battles but
by the defenders concluding that further resistance was pointless and giving up
the fight.17 In contrast with French methods, in which the artillery dictated the
pace of advance, which produced an “entire system . . . designed to be propelled
forward by pressure from above, rather than by being pulled from below,” the
German tactical system dictated that the pace and direction of the battle be determined by the efforts of the frontline infantry, with junior officers encouraged,
indeed required, to exercise tactical initiative aggressively.18
The results of these methods when applied in the initial German offensives of
1918 were impressive. With remarkable speed, German attacks achieved dramatic penetrations of the enemy line and reached depths in Allied positions that had
not been seen on the western front since the beginning of the war. Unfortunately
for the Germans, while they had figured out how to break through the enemy
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position fast enough to win the tactical race between the offense and defense,
this simply meant that the race then shifted to the operational level, where they
were less prepared. The Germans did not have the means to win this race, as the
Allies were able to slow down and contain breakthroughs owing to their ability to
bring up operational reserves and to the exhaustion of the German attack troops.
The German effort was undermined further by the high command’s desire to
maximize lower-level initiative at the expense of adequate planning to connect
tactical successes to a larger operational framework.19
Although they ultimately failed to achieve a favorable operational or strategic
decision in World War I, imperial Germany’s tactics have won praise from students of military affairs, who believe they seeded Germany’s successful interwar
innovation, which produced decisive victories in the opening campaigns of
World War II and sustained high combat effectiveness throughout the war. The
fact that they offered a qualitative approach and solution to the problem, in contrast to the more quantitative French methods, also contributed to their appeal
to students of war, who generally have viewed strategies of attrition negatively,
especially those in the United States who faced the challenge of countering Soviet
mass on potential Cold War battlefields.20
Moreover, just as appealing as the tactical methods themselves is the process
that the Germans used to approach the problem and how it shaped, and was
shaped by, German military culture. In the process of developing doctrine during the war and continuing to develop it afterward, the Germans demonstrated
a salutary and impressive openness to ideas (even those that were not their own,
as illustrated by their debt to concepts proposed by French junior officer André
Laffargue). The German approach was characterized by a willingness to listen
to frontline commanders, engage them in the process of doctrinal development,
and encourage them to exercise aggressiveness and initiative on the battlefield.
Thus, the Germany army went into the interwar period with a dynamic approach
to doctrine, as well as an offensive mind-set that translated into a commitment to
maneuver and the ruthless exploitation of battlefield opportunities, in contrast to
the French, whom one scholar described as “frozen in time somewhere between
Verdun and the autumn offensive of 1918.” Altogether, the German army’s aggressive mind-set, in Williamson Murray’s words, “provided a solid framework
for thinking” about the problems of the modern battlefield. This translated into
the doctrine and organizational ethos that proved so deadly in 1939 and 1940.21
Although infiltration tactics did not deliver operational or strategic victory in
1918, the methods and the process by which the Germans developed and built on
them during the interwar period and the dramatic results they produced on the
battlefield have been lauded as manifestations of a “genius for war” that contrasted conspicuously with their more insular and hidebound French counterparts.22
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THE AMPHIBIOUS PROBLEM AGAINST JAPAN
Western Europe was not the only place where the first half of the twentieth
century saw militaries confronting the challenge of figuring out how to use the
modern tools of industrial warfare effectively. As the United States contemplated
the prospect of a military contest for the western Pacific—something strategists
had been doing for decades by the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941—it was clear that it faced compelling and challenging problems. For a
United States that sought to restrain and contain Japanese power in Asia, it was
a question of how to project combat power across the world’s largest ocean. Of
particular concern in this context was the task of securing possession of small islands between Hawaii and mainland Asia so they could be used to support a drive
across the Pacific by the U.S. Navy’s capital ships. The U.S. Marine Corps, partly
as an act of organizational self-preservation, took up the challenge of figuring out
a solution to one of the critical military problems confronting American strategists: how to conduct successful amphibious attacks that would enable American
forces to wrest control of those islands from the Japanese.
Few challenges appeared as formidable in the interwar period as making an
opposed amphibious landing. If conducting a successful frontal assault on continental Europe seemed daunting in light of the experience of World War I, an
opposed landing in the face of modern firepower to seize the small islands that the
United States would need to defeat Japan seemed so hazardous that few were eager
to take up the challenge. Although the first few decades of the twentieth century
saw Western militaries conduct several successful amphibious operations, these
largely validated, in historian Allan R. Millett’s words, “a similar basic concept for
successful landings: land where there is no opposition from ground forces.” Meanwhile, the miserable, unsuccessful effort of the British and French at Gallipoli in
1915 cast a dark shadow over the question of how to conduct amphibious operations against a beach defended by a belligerent equipped with modern firepower.23
However, the operational and strategic objective that amphibious operations
were to serve—securing western Pacific islands to support the U.S. Navy’s offensive drive toward Japan—was critical to American prospects for success. Of
particular interest were islands that could serve as air bases to support the U.S.
Navy’s capital ships against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the course of a grand
naval offensive across the western Pacific toward Japan—islands that otherwise
the Japanese would use to support their resistance against the American advance.24 The problem, of course, was that, while there were many islands between
Hawaii and Japan, the need for islands that could support airfields narrowed the
geographic options significantly, and it could be assumed safely that islands the
American planners identified as operationally desirable also would be obvious to
Japanese planners. Thus, the possibility that there would be islands of strategic
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and operational value that remained unoccupied appeared slim. Moreover, many
of these islands would be small enough, and offer so few practicable landing sites,
that the most effective approach to amphibious operations—namely, landing
where there will be no resistance—would not be available.
There were, to be sure, many problems unique to the opposed amphibious
assault. “Moving men and equipment across open water in the face of carefully
calculated fire is an extremely dangerous proposition,” historian Jerold E. Brown
laconically notes. “Furthermore, the defender has the advantage of time and space
. . . and he often has time to prepare his defenses.”25 On top of this were the headaches associated with coordinating land, sea, and air elements. In addition, since the
United States would be conducting these operations as part of a massive strategic
and operational exercise in power projection across the world’s greatest ocean, there
were a host of logistical issues that were incomparable in both scale and character
to what those charged with developing doctrine for the battlefields of Europe faced.
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the travails of
the French army, the story of how the U.S. Marine Corps solved the problems of
opposed amphibious operations in the Pacific often has been cited by students
of innovation as a great example of institutional effectiveness. In line with the
concept for a war with Japan laid out in War Plan ORANGE, the visionary Marine
commandant John A. Lejeune entrusted a young, somewhat eccentric, lieutenant colonel named Earl “Pete” Ellis with the task of studying the theater of operations. Ellis’s observations, laid out in Operation Plan 712 along with careful
study of maneuvers conducted during the 1920s, then were incorporated into an
effort to think critically about and develop doctrine—in contrast to the French
schools, where the mission was to inculcate doctrine and “school solutions”—in
which vital work was done by students and faculty at the Marine Corps schools
at Quantico. Throughout, the Marines demonstrated the sort of commitment
to rigorous professional military education; to entrusting critical tasks to junior
officers such as Ellis and Majors Charles Barrett and DeWitt Peck; and to open,
honest discussion of problems that was absent in the French army. The product
of these efforts—more remarkable because the Marines simultaneously were
analyzing their ongoing operations in the “Banana Wars,” producing the Small
Wars Manual, which remains an invaluable work on the subject to this day—was
the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations.26
This document, officially adopted as doctrine by the U.S. Navy and distributed as Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 1938, laid out the conceptual
framework for addressing the problems of amphibious landings. After continuing to refine the implementation of its concepts using the results of landing exercises, the Marine Corps took its amphibious doctrine to war. The first tests, at
Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942 and 1943, although bloodier and tougher than
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initially expected, validated the doctrine. They also validated the organizational
approach and culture that produced that doctrine, especially the Marines’ process of continual refinement as they conducted the grueling offensives that put
American forces into position to bring about the total defeat of imperial Japan.27
Contributing to the contrast between history’s glowing judgment of the Marines
and that of the French army is that, while there were many differences in the specifics (French commanders did not have to devote attention to the merits of rubber
landing craft or the construction of wharves, for instance), the fundamental problem the Marine Corps faced and addressed so successfully was in essence the same
as the one the French army faced in Europe. Like the French and the Germans in
World War I and during the interwar period, the Marines had to figure out how
to combine fire and maneuver successfully to assault defenders equipped with
modern firepower. The Marines’ success, of course, demonstrates the methods and
qualities we associate with military organizations that innovate effectively, so one
must think that surely their solution more closely followed the Germans’ aggressive
maneuver doctrine than the French preference for mass, right?
Wrong. If the Marines demonstrated a more commendable (and Germanic)
organizational ethos in the process of innovation, their solution to the amphibious assault problem was in fact more Gallic than Teutonic. Like the French doctrine of methodical battle, Marine doctrine placed heavy emphasis on firepower.
In line with historical experience (not to mention common sense), FTP 167
posited that, in light of the difficulties associated with landings, “superiority of
force, particularly at the point of landing, is essential to success,” and that consequently “[b]eaches strongly organized for defense should be avoided if possible.”
In the event that an opposed landing could not be avoided, once an island had
been selected for assault the U.S. Navy would endeavor to isolate it, to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing it before, during, or in the aftermath of the assault. The
“attacking force,” consisting of “two elements of major importance, namely—The
landing force [and] Naval gunfire,” then would go to work.28
First, naval gunfire would pound the island. In its treatment of the effect
sought, FTP 167 made a distinction between neutralization (“by short bursts of
fire of great density to secure the advantage and effect of shock and surprise”)
and destruction. The manual expressed a decided preference for the former,
declaring, “Destruction should only be attempted under favorable conditions.”
Once firepower had done its job, Marine infantry would make a frontal assault to
break through the enemy’s defenses—not on a narrow front, with an eye toward
infiltration and deep penetration, as in the German system, but on “a wide front
in order to increase the speed of the landing,” avoid exposed flanks, and facilitate
coordination with suppressive fire support ahead of the advancing infantry. Marine infantry would seize the enemy frontline positions that had been neutralized
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by fire and then push far enough inland to secure the beach, while staying within
the range of naval fire support. FTP 167 advised that “initial assault echelons
are particularly apt to become disorganized during and immediately after the
landing, and they cannot be expected to make deep penetrations against strong
opposition,” which made it “often desirable . . . to have leading assault units secure a limited objective.”29 On a small enough island, such as those that would be
encountered initially in the drive across the Pacific from Pearl Harbor, anything
beyond that would be unnecessary.
The Marines then would consolidate the positions they had gained, fighting
off any enemy counterattacks attempting to dislodge them. Then, once the island
or islands capable of supporting airfields were secured, the Navy would continue
its westward advance to the next island chain. This way, U.S. forces would work
their way methodically toward victory much as the Allies had on the western
front in 1918. They would leverage superior resources to attack and seize one
island chain, then another, attriting the Japanese armed forces as part of a larger
strategy that, in cooperation with allies, also cut Japanese access to resources.
Then, if the decisive naval engagement envisioned in both Japan’s “interceptionattrition” strategy and Plan ORANGE took place, the Japanese would be at a grave
disadvantage. If not, the Japanese war effort in the western Pacific would collapse
from the exhaustion of matériel and manpower.30
Of course, it is a truism that no plan, no matter how commendable the effort
to produce it may be, survives first contact with the enemy, necessitating modification of the initial assumptions and plans. This was certainly the case for the
Marines and their doctrine for an opposed amphibious landing, which first was
tested truly in November 1943 in Operation GALVANIC, targeting the Gilbert Islands. Planners identified wresting possession of Betio Island, the main island in
the Tarawa atoll, from its five thousand Japanese defenders as the most important
objective. For the most part, the Marines’ doctrine and the process that developed
it were proved to be generally sound; however, the operation also demonstrated
that they needed some modifications—ones that pushed Marine doctrine further
in a Gallic direction.
As noted, the fire-support doctrine in FTP 167 preferred neutralization over
destruction. Yet, as one Marine who landed at Tarawa later explained to an interviewer for the World at War series, this was not what the landing teams were
told to expect. “They thought they would level the island and completely demolish everything,” he recalled, “[t]hat there wouldn’t be a living soul on the island.”
Unfortunately, the Marines who made the initial assault found that, contrary to
the boasts of some naval officers, this was not the case at all.31 Setting aside the
stated preference in FTP 167 for neutralization over destruction, Colonel Merritt
Edson, the Second Marine Division chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel David
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Shoup, the commander of the initial assault force, developed a plan in which the
assault on Betio would be preceded by several days of preparatory air and naval
bombardment. Naval planners, however—afraid of leaving their vessels exposed
in the event of an appearance by a significant Japanese naval force (as had happened in August 1942 at Guadalcanal, producing an embarrassing defeat at Savo
Island)—refused to provide it. Instead, although there would be air and naval
strikes for a few days before the actual attack, for the real work on the day of the
assault warships would provide only a three-hour bombardment.32
Those who presumed that the use of artillery in a short bombardment for
“neutralization,” along the lines of the German tactic, would be sufficient were
badly mistaken.33 As the Marines began their assault, they were greeted with
ferocious Japanese artillery and small-arms fire. The ordeal was made worse by
the inability of the Higgins boats that many were using for the assault to cross the
reef in front of the landing beaches, which compelled Marines to wade forward
about six hundred yards under fire. Ultimately, enough Marines were able to
reach shore to win the battle and secure the island—one that was not even three
miles long and at no point was more than eight hundred yards across. However,
even with a three-to-one manpower advantage it took American forces three days
of brutal combat to eliminate Japanese resistance and claim victory—at a cost of
over one thousand dead and more than two thousand wounded.34 Not surprisingly, the heavy casualties suffered and the fact that the fight for Betio had been
much, much tougher than expected provoked considerable discussion among
Marine and Navy officers about how to improve their performance.35
“[N]ot the least” of the lessons learned, historians Benis Frank and Henry
Shaw declare, “was the importance of naval gunfire.” Marine planners who had
chafed at the limits the Navy had imposed on naval gunfire prior to the assault
on Betio had been proved correct, and in the future it was accepted that “the
preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period.”36
If the difficulties at Tarawa were not to recur in future assaults and casualties
were to be kept to an acceptable level, a few hours’ bombardment with an eye
toward neutralization was not enough. “One of the great lessons learned about
naval gunfire,” James Stockman observes in a 1947 study for the Marine Corps
Historical Section, “was the need for destruction rather than neutralization. . . .
[P]reparatory bombardment and shelling to be delivered on enemy-defended
islands similar to Betio would have to be increased in duration and weight, all
of this with an eye toward . . . total destruction.” After Tarawa, writes Joseph H.
Alexander, perhaps the foremost modern scholar of Marine amphibious operations in the Pacific War, “[t]he duration and effectiveness of preliminary shelling improved . . . but the Marines always wanted more.”37 That this lesson had
been absorbed fully would be evident a few months later. When the Marines
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conducted Operation FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands in early 1944, bombardments would be longer (two days for the landing at Kwajalein Atoll, as compared
with three hours at Tarawa) and heavier, with the effect that the landings were
accomplished handily and the operation’s objectives attained much quicker than
initial plans had anticipated.38
SIMILAR CONCEPTS, DIFFERENT RESULTS
Why were the Marines so “French” in their approach to assault tactics? The
answer is, obviously, the similarity of the specific problems they faced. Williamson Murray identifies specificity—by which he means “the presence of a
specific military problem the solution of which offered significant advantages to
furthering the achievement of national strategy”—as one of the critical factors
that contributed to success or failure in innovation during the interwar period.39
First, like the French in their approach to the German problem, the U.S. Marine
Corps did not have a compelling need to bring about a quick strategic decision
in its contest with the Japanese. Both the French and the Marines faced an enemy
that was inferior in resources—at least if the French fought as part of a coalition,
which they correctly presumed would be the case. The presumption of matériel
superiority would translate naturally into the ability to bring heavy firepower
to the battlefield. In addition, unlike the Germans, for the French and the U.S.
Marines a successful frontal assault was a tactically sufficient and satisfactory
accomplishment, whereas the Germans needed tactical assaults to set the stage
for operational exploitation.40 The small size of the islands the Marines first had
to take in the drive across the Pacific envisioned by Plan ORANGE effectively
eliminated the requirement for operational exploitation by the assault force.41
Once the Marines seized the wrecked enemy front lines—and with the small size
of those islands precluding the Japanese from using defense in depth to preserve
manpower—they effectively had control of the island. The French army, bearing
heavy scars from repeated failed efforts to translate tactical success into operational opportunity on the western front, and confident in its ability to prevail in
a war of exhaustion, sought to deliver victory without the extraordinary costs
that exploiting tactical penetrations produced. For all the success that the German army’s infiltration tactics achieved in terms of territory gained, it came at a
heavy price.
Interestingly, in a replay of what happened on the western front, improvements in the fire support provided by the Marines and Navy for amphibious
landings caused the Japanese to alter their tactics as the operational geography
changed. As the fighting reached closer to the Asian mainland, the islands that
the Marines needed to assault were much larger than the small atolls of the central Pacific. Eschewing their earlier notion that the “enemy will be destroyed at
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the beach,” and having been crushed under the weight of American firepower
in the Marshalls, Japanese commanders took advantage of the larger islands on
which they now were fighting to abandon the method of defending forward on
the beach, where their men could not hope to maintain combat effectiveness under the weight of USN gunfire.42 Instead, echoing the German shift to defense in
depth after 1916, Japanese commanders at Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa pulled
back from forward positions on the beaches to concentrate their defenses inland.
Consequently, American forces found themselves facing limited resistance to
their initial landings, only to face a murderous task as they pushed beyond the
beaches. True to the pseudo-French methods they adopted, the Marines did not
approach this task by aping German tactics, which relied heavily on an assumption that disrupted defenders would surrender out of shock rather than fight to
the death, and thus were ill suited for use against Japanese forces that were willing to fight to the death. Instead, they relied on heavy firepower and methodical
advances to grind down the Japanese defenders in grueling, murderous battles of
attrition.43 Had such methods been briefed in 1934, it is not hard to imagine a far
more friendly reception from a French audience than a German one.
Comparing the French army’s and U.S. Marines’ approaches to doctrinal development offers a compelling reminder that the ultimate test for assessing military
organizations’ approach to tactical problems is how well suited they were to the
specific problem that particular military faced. It also underlines the need to be
skeptical of overly simplistic conclusions about linear cause-and-effect relationships among innovation, methods, and battlefield results. As Carl von Clausewitz
noted when discussing the value of historical examples to guide how to think about
problems, “If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed.”
Unfortunately, he laments, a tendency to search for simple prescriptive lessons that
results in insufficient attention to both the broader and the deeper contexts that
shaped past events often has led to “superficial, irresponsible handling of history”
that then produced “hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.”44
Industrial-age firepower presented the military organizations that fought the
world wars with the daunting challenge of figuring out how to employ firepower
in ways that made it possible for offensive maneuver to secure tactical, operational, and strategic objectives at an acceptable cost. In assessing how well they
addressed this problem, paying attention to context is critical. To paraphrase
Clausewitz, while one can point to the French experience in 1940 as one case in
which methodical, firepower-heavy tactics produced failure, one also can point to
the experience of the Marines in the Pacific as an example where it produced success. For that matter, General Matthew Ridgway successfully employed firepower
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and methodical advances in Korea to attrit and exhaust the enemy rather than
achieve a quick, decisive battlefield victory—the same strategic context in which
the French and Marines developed their doctrines.45
France’s and Germany’s efforts to address the frontal-assault problem led them
down different paths, to be sure, with the latter’s approach seeming to have received unimpeachable validation in 1940. Yet looking at these organizations and
their operations by comparing them with the efforts of the Marines complicates
the picture, as does considering them in depth, as historians Robert Doughty
and Williamson Murray have. Although critical in their assessments of French
doctrine and institutions, in their accounts of the 1940 campaign Doughty and
Murray identify an array of other factors—errors in operational planning, the
by no means predetermined outcome of specific tactical events, and even plain
luck—that must be weighed just as heavily as, if not more so than, doctrinal and
institutional issues to explain the campaign’s course and outcome. In the process,
they offer a strong reminder to be cautious in identifying cause-and-effect relationships when assessing innovation, since but for a different break here or there,
firepower-heavy methodical operations may well have received validation from
operations in both Europe and the Pacific.46
Of course, they did not. Nonetheless, while giving due weight to battlefield outcomes, we must take care, to borrow from Dennis Showalter, not to approach the
study of the military past in the spirit of Calvinist theology, “interpreting victory
and defeat as judgments on the military righteous,” and assume that our task is
merely to validate and catalog the virtues of the blessed and the sins of the fallen.47
It is important not to let this all-too-frequent bias, or the understandable desire to
identify concrete cause-and-effect relationships that can be applied to the process
of innovation today, prevent us from taking full account of contingency, specificity, and context in studying the past. After all, it is in considering and taking full
account of all the factors that shape the course and outcomes of the efforts of
military organizations in the past that Clausewitz places our best hope of avoiding
“wrong ideas and bogus theorizing”—and their consequences—in the future.48
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